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 1 Introduction
“Monetary policy works largely through indirect channels–in particular, by inﬂuencing
private-sector expectations and thus long-term interest rates.” Bernanke (2004)
“Financial markets are the channel through which our policy affects the economy, and asset
prices contain valuable information about investors’ expectations for the course of policy,
economic activity, and inﬂation, as well as the risks about those expectations.” Kohn (2005)
Bond rates are essential conduits for the transmission of monetary policy. But bond rates contain bond
trader expectations of future policy rates, not recent policy rates. Thus, monetary policy depends on the
policy perceptions of the bond market, and the connection of these perceptions to announced or recently
observed policy is not fully understood.
The yield to maturity of a zero coupon bond is the average of forward rates over the maturity of the
bond. If the bond rate is the principal policy transmission channel, what matters for stabilizing policy is that
the bond rate average of the forward rates displays an elastic response to expected inﬂation. Consequently,
perceived inelastic responses by the policy rate to inﬂation in the short-run may be counterbalanced by
elastic responses by forward rates in the remaining periods encompassed by the bond.
Indeed, as noted later, long-run responses of nominal bond rates to inﬂation appear to have been greater
than unity since the mid-1960s, both for samples before and after 1980. As bond rates contain averages
of expected policy rates, this seems inconsistent with empirical evidence in a number of papers, such as
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), that a general feature of US monetary
policy in the 1960s and 1970s was an inelastic response of the policy rate with respect to inﬂation.
One explanation of the different inﬂation sensitivity of the policy rate and of bond rates may be that
forward rate term premiums are also responsive to macro variables, including inﬂation. If this is so, term
premiums demanded by traders may compensate for modestly unstable short-run policy.
An additional possible explanation is that bond traders in the 1960s and 1970s expected stable responses
in the longer run. But, at a minimum, the concurrence of inelastic policy rate adjustments and elastic bond
rate responses suggests that the connection between anticipated and recent policy may be more tenuous than
commonly recognized by extrapolations of recently observed policy rate responses.
The central roles of bond rates and the perceptions of bond traders in the transmission of policy are
discussed in remaining sections of the paper. Section 2 examines the recent use of indeterminacy analysis in
1interpretations of US monetary policy during the 1960s and 1970s and indicates that an alternative condition
for determinacy is required if the bond rate is the policy transmission channel. Section 3 demonstrates that
frictions in adjusting real expenditures are essential to the transmission role of bond rates and, consequently,
bond rates play no role in the dynamics of the standard New Keynesian (NK) model. This section also
compares the responsiveness of historical bond rates to macro variables since the mid-1960s. Section 4
brieﬂy sketches a no-arbitrage model of the term structure with term premiums that reﬂect time-varying
compensation for macroeconomic uncertainty, and extends this theoretical model to allow for the possibility
of horizon-dependent expectations by bond traders. Section 5 presents estimated responses of forward rates
to forecasts of macro variables, and section 6 concludes.
2 Determinate and indeterminate interpretations of the 1970s
Although a number of studies have suggested that US monetary policy was an important contributor to
the size and persistence of inﬂation in the 1970s, there remains considerable disagreement as to the major
ﬂaw in the design of historical policy. This section uses a simple model to illustrate dynamic implications
for inﬂation of two prominent interpretations of U.S. monetary policy, one suggesting the policy rate was
inﬂuenced by erroneous estimates of the natural rate for economic activity and the other indicating the
policy rate did not keep pace with inﬂation. The model is then extended to show the dynamic implications
for inﬂation if the bond rate is the principal conduit of policy.
Orphanides (2003) suggests that U.S. monetary policy in the 1970s was consistent with a Taylor rule but
the central bank severely overestimated the trend of potential output, leading to policy rates that were below
those consistent with the Taylor benchmark policy.
The dynamic implications of this natural rate error interpretation are equivalent to those of a policy rate
feedback response where the effective inﬂation target is larger than that originally intended by the central
bank. Suppose, as suggested by Orphanides, the intended policy rate response was generated by the classic
Taylor (1993) rule
rt = ¯ ρ + πt + .5(πt − ¯ πcb) + .5(yt − ¯ ycb
t ), (1)
where rt denotes the nominal policy rate, ¯ ρ is the equilibrium real rate, ¯ πcb is the intended inﬂation target,
and ¯ ycb
t is the central bank perception of the natural rate for output which overstates the true natural rate,
¯ yt. The policy rule in equation (1) is equivalent to a policy description where the policy rate responds to the
2output deviation from the true natural rate of output,
rt = ¯ ρ + πt + .5(πt − ¯ π∗
t) + .5(yt − ¯ yt). (2)
but the effective inﬂation target is increased by precisely the overestimate of the output natural rate,
¯ π∗
t = ¯ πcb + (¯ ycb
t − ¯ yt).
Because the nominal policy rate response to inﬂation in the Taylor benchmark rule exceeds unity,
this interpretation implies that the transitional period of rising inﬂation following the shift in the effective
inﬂation target is self-terminating. That is, in well-behaved models of the economy with an elastic response
of the policy rate to inﬂation, the solution for inﬂation is determinate and will eventually converge to the
new inﬂation target. Thus, under the natural rate error interpretation, rising inﬂation in the 1970s is due
to the dynamic transition of inﬂation from the neighborhood of the intended inﬂation target, ¯ πcb, to the
neighborhood of the effective inﬂation target, ¯ π∗
t. Ceteris paribus, the dynamic transition of inﬂation will be
accompanied by positive output “gaps,” yt − ¯ yt > 0, induced by the inadvertent reductions in real interest
rates.
Analternative interpretation of the 1970s isproposed by Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000) where the response
of the policy rate is inelastic with respect to expected inﬂation. Under this passive policy interpretation,
the economy is vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling expectations of higher inﬂation induced by agent forecasts of
inﬂationary shocks (exogenous sunspots). Unlike the natural rate error interpretation, the sensitivity to
arbitrary sunspots is not self-terminating and will continue as long as the policy response is passive. The
solution for inﬂation is indeterminate, and there is no mechanism for inﬂation to remain in the neighborhood
of the central bank target for inﬂation.
2.1 A model of (in)determinate inﬂation
A rudimentary model is used to illustrate differences in dynamic behavior under these alternative
interpretations of monetary policy.
˜ yt = −aEt(˜ rt − ˜ πt+1) + et,
˜ πt = Et˜ πt+1 + b˜ yt,
˜ rt = cEt˜ πt+1, (3)
3where ˜ xt denotes the equilibrium deviation of variable xt. The ﬁrst equation in (3) indicates that deviations
in output, ˜ yt are determined by equilibrium deviations in the one-period ex ante real interest rate, Et{˜ rt −
˜ πt+1}, and by a stochastic disturbance, et. In the second equation, equilibrium deviations in the inﬂation
rate, ˜ πt, are determined by a standard New Keynesian (NK) pricing equation, and the third equation in (3)
describes a forward-looking policy response by equilibrium deviations in the nominal policy rate, ˜ rt. All
coefﬁcients are positive, and the output equation disturbance is a ﬁrst-order autoregression, et = γet−1+ǫt;
thus, there is a single structural i.i.d. shock, ǫ.
Eliminating the policy rate by substituting the third equation of (3) into the ﬁrst
˜ yt = −aEt(c − 1)˜ πt+1 + et, (4)
and using this to eliminate output from the second equation in (3), gives a ﬁrst-order equation for inﬂation
˜ πt = (1 − ab(c − 1))Et˜ πt+1 + bet. (5)
Consistent with the natural rate error conjecture, a determinate solution for inﬂation will exist if the
policy response lies in the interval 1 < c < 1 + 2
ab.1 Deﬁning   ≡ 1− ab(c − 1), inﬂation dynamics in this
rudimentary model are driven solely by the autoregressive demand shock,






1 − γ 
, (6)
and the one-period forecast error of inﬂation is ηt+1 ≡ ˜ πt+1 − Et˜ πt+1 =
bǫt+1
1−γ .2
By contrast, consistent with the passive policy conjecture, the empirical estimates of U.S. monetary
policy in Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000) indicate that policy rate responses to inﬂation in the 1960s and 1970s
were inelastic, c < 1. In the current example, this implies   > 1; consequently, stable solutions to equation







et−1 + ηt, (7)
1Typically, the product ab is a small positive fraction. Representative estimates of the product of output and inﬂation equation
slopes include .014 in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and .15 in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
2As with standard NK models, there are no intrinsic dynamics associated with equation (5). Thus, a lengthy dynamic transition
to a new equilibrium under the natural error interpretation requires additional sources of lagged adjustment. If the revision in the
effective inﬂation target is not known to agents under the natural rate error conjecture, lengthy learning lags can be associated with
statistical analysis of observed inﬂation, primarily due to the time required for observations of the new policy regime, vid. Kozicki
and Tinsley (2001a).
4The forecast error, ηt, is an arbitrary martingale difference, which may or may not be correlated with the
structural disturbance. As in Lubik and Schorfeide (2004), the forecast error can be represented as
ηt = mǫt + st, (8)
where st is an exogenous “sunspot” shock. Thus, in contrast to the solution in (6), rational expectations does
not limit the forecast error, ηt, to be a unique function of the structural shock, ǫt.3
The current period responses to the sunspot shock, st are
∆s˜ πt = st,
∆s˜ rt =
c




1 + ab(1 − c)
st, (9)
where ∆sxt ≡ xt(st) − xt(0), and responses are largest for inﬂation. Similar to the consequences of an
overestimate of the natural rate of output or, equivalently an increase in the effective central bank target for
inﬂation, the contribution of a positive sunspot is to increase both output and inﬂation.
Thus, neither an inadvertent increase in the central bank target for inﬂation nor the sunspot interpretation
is alone able to explain the general tendency towards stagﬂation in the 1970s. The twelve-month moving
average of inﬂation and the negative of the monthly unemployment “gap” deviation are displayed in Figure 1
for a1960-1990 sample. Although the positive association between inﬂation and the negative unemployment
gap is reasonably close in the 1960s, the two series diverge in the 1970s, with inﬂation continuing to rise
and the negative unemployment gap trending toward or below zero.4
Kozicki and Tinsley (2005a) suggest an alternative interpretation of the 1970s, where U.S. monetary
policy was directed at achieving designated growth rates of the narrow money supply. The policy of
money growth targeting is conﬁrmed by transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and by
empirical estimates of time-varying responses by policy rates to real-time brieﬁng forecasts.
The historical conduct of money growth rate targeting supports two disparate implications of the natural
rate error and passive policy interpretations of the 1970s. First, as in the natural rate error interpretation,
3Alternative solutions to (5) and the additional degree of freedom introduced under indeterminacy are demonstrated in the
appendix.
4Lubik and Schorfeide (2004) provide posterior estimates for two types of sunspots in a 1960Q1-1979Q2 sample of US data.
In the case of orthogonal sunspots, m = 0, sunspot contributions to the variances of inﬂation and the nominal policy rate are about
70%, with nearly all of the variance of output attributed to demand shocks. In the case of non-orthogonal sunspots, the sunspot
contributions to the variances of inﬂation and the nominal interest rate are modest, about 10%.
5intermediate targeting of the money supply in the 1970s induced an increase in the inﬂation target. Under
money growth targeting, the effective inﬂation target is determined by the natural rate version of the equation
of exchange
¯ πt = ∆¯ mt − ∆¯ yt + ∆¯ vt, (10)
where ∆¯ mt denotes the FOMC target for money supply growth and ∆¯ vt is the trend growth of velocity.
As in the natural rate error interpretation, an unexpected reduction in the growth rate of trend output in the
1970s, ∆¯ yt ↓, induced an increase in the effective inﬂation target. However, the money growth targeting
policy induced even larger increases in the effective inﬂation target due to sizeable unexpected positive shifts
in the trend growth of velocity, ∆¯ vt ↑.
Second, empirical estimates of policy rate responses in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005a) also support the
description of passive monetary policy in the 1970s. As documented in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005a), FOMC
transcripts in the 1970s indicate that the nominal policy rate settings were directed at reversing projected
deviations of money supply growth from target growth rates. However, empirical results indicate that
long-run responses of the policy rate were inelastic with respect to the growth rate of nominal aggregates.
2.2 Inﬂation determinacy under bond rate transmission
The general presumption in the literature is that evidence of passive monetary policy in the 1960s and 1970s
implies that the central bank and the private sector may have been inﬂuenced by exogenous inﬂationary
sunspots. However, if the principal transmission of monetary policy is through the responses of private
sector borrowing rates to the policy rate, then the susceptibility of the economy to sunspots depends on the
perceptions of bond traders regarding the passivity of anticipated policy. Thus, the sunspot interpretation
is based on two untested assumptions: First, that bond traders can infer, in real time, that the central bank
policy is passive.5 And second, that the passivity of monetary policy is expected to persist over lengthy
forecast horizons. With regard to the ﬁrst assumption, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2001b) indicate that
the mean lag of adjustment of the perceived inﬂation target consistent with Treasury bond rates exceeded
5 years in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, FOMC announcements in the 1970s regarding explicit policy
5In contrast to the regression analysis in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), empirical analysis in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005a) uses
the retrospective advantage of access to the central bank real-time forecasts of explanatory variables. If external observers are not
privy to central bank information, Beyer and Farmer (2004) illustrate that it is not always possible for the observers to discriminate
between determinate and indeterminate policies.
6targets were limited to one-year horizons. It is not obvious that bond traders would extrapolate difﬁculties
in reaching one-year objectives to policy failure in the long run.
To illustrate the difference in conditions for indeterminacy if the transmission role of the bond rate is
made explicit, we return to the simple model used earlier but replace the one-period interest rate in the output
equation by a two-period real bond rate.
˜ yt = −
a
2
Et(˜ rt − ˜ πt+1 + ˜ rt+1 − ˜ πt+2) + et,
˜ πt = Et˜ πt+1 + b˜ yt,
˜ rt = c1Et˜ πt+1,
Et˜ rt+1 = c2Et˜ πt+2, (11)
The fourth equation represents bond traders’ expectation in t of the policy rate in t+1, where the perception
of the future policy response, c2, is not restricted to be identical to the response perceived in the current
period, c1.
Substituting the ﬁrst, third and fourth equations in (11) into the second equation gives a second-order
equation for inﬂation






Et˜ πt+2 + bet, (12)
The solution for inﬂation has the form
˜ πt = Et{
bet
(1 − λ−1
1 F)(1 − λ−1
2 F)
}, (13)





λ1 + λ2 =
2 − ab(c1 − 1)
ab(c2 − 1)
. (14)
The perceptions of the bond traders must satisfy three conditions for determinacy, vid. Woodford (2003)












6The roots of the associated companion form system for (12) are derived in the appendix.
7The ﬁrst two conditions in (15) establish upper bounds for the policy responses and will depend, in general,
on the particular speciﬁcations of the model.
The third requirement for determinacy in (15) is not dependent on other model parameters and provides
a lower bound for the average perceived policy rate response. Thus, even if the current period response is
passive, c1 < 1, the average perceived response may satisfy the lower bound requirement for determinacy.
This is a generalization of the Taylor Principle for one-period interest rates, where the nominal bond rate
response to anticipated inﬂation over the maturity of the bond should exceed unity.7
The next section examines the theoretical basis of the fundamental assumption that bond rates provide
the principal transmission channel for monetary policy, and presents summary measures of historical bond
rate responses to inﬂation.
3 The role of bond rates in the transmission of monetary policy
The key to an essential role for the term structure in the transmission of monetary policy is the presence
of real-world frictions or dynamic adjustment costs. The level of the capital stock, and the level of the
associated output or consumption, is determined by the level of bond rates. In a frictionless world, the
choice between consumption today or consumption tomorrow is a function only of the one-period interest
rate, which is equivalent (under risk neutrality) to one-period holding returns to bonds.
By contrast, when expenditure decisions are subject to adjustment frictions, dynamic adjustment of
consumption is a function of the full term structure of interest rates. The next two subsections illustrate
the transmission role of bond rates for two examples of frictions: adjustment costs for investment in capital
goods, and the presence of habit in household utility speciﬁcations.
3.1 Bond rates in the demand for quasi-ﬁxed investment
The implication of transactions costs for the policy transmission role of bond rates is illustrated using a
marginal q model of investment.
7Here, as elsewhere in this paper, conditions for determinacy can be extended to include policy responses to equilibrium
deviations in real activity. Strictly speaking, conditions for determinacy are system properties and not just limited to the inﬂation
responsiveness of current and anticipated real policy rates, such as models where nominal interest rates may play an important
stabilizing role, vid. Beyer and Farmer (2004). To simplify exposition, discussion in this paper assumes real variables, such as
output, are responsive only to real interest rates, consistent with responses by households and ﬁrms in conventional NK models.
8The owner of a depreciable capital asset, with a physical half-life of 1
δs, chooses the level of capital, Ks,









subject to a dynamic constraint on the evolution of installed capital
Ks,t+1 ≤ (1 − δs)Ks,t + Is,t − c(Is,t/Is,t−1)Is,t,
where β is the household discount factor, Uc,t is the owner (representative household) marginal utility of
consumption, Rk
s is the real return on a unit of capital, PI
s the relative price of replacement capital, δs is the
rate of depreciation, and c(Is,t/Is,t−1) is the cost of adjustment for investment.





















where PK, the Lagrangian multiplier of the equation for the evolution of capital, is the relative price of
installed capital; and c′
i(x1/x2) denotes the partial derivative of the adjustment cost function with respect to
the ith argument.





















The second line in (18) uses an implication of a standard household Euler equation for consumption that the
real rate of interest is R−1
e,t = β
Uc,t+1
Uc,t . The third line indicates that the return to capital in the nth period
of the forecast horizon, (1 − δs)n−1Rk
t+n, is discounted by the gross real yield-to-maturity on an n-period
bond.










(1 + β)c′′Et˜ qt, (19)







By inspection, the eigenvalues of the characteristic equation are (1, 1
β). Thus, the solution for the level
of investment expenditure






requires forecasts of marginal qt+i, and the associated term structure of interest rates as illustrated in (18),
over the indeﬁnite future.
3.2 Bond rates in NK equations for output
The preceding subsection indicates that the demand for total expenditures, aggregated over goods with
disparate durability and adjustment costs, will be a function of the full term structure of interest rates.
By contrast, the convention in NK models is to include only a single short-term or long-term interest rate
in the output equation.9 This subsection illustrates that the dynamic transmission role of interest rates is
signiﬁcantly altered by introducing habit preferences into the utility function of the representative household.
In the standard NK model, the output equation is based on the household Euler equation for








subject to the ﬂow budget constraint
Ct+i + Bt+i ≤ wt+iNt+i + Re,t+iBt+i−1.
where C denotes consumption; B is the stock of real bonds which earn the one-period gross real return, Re;
and household employment, N, is paid the real wage, w.
8As in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), the level and ﬁrst derivative of the adjustment cost function, c(.), are zero in
equilibrium.
9The output equation is a explicit function of the one-period real interest rate in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), a four-quarter
average of real interest rates in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), a two-year real bond rate in Coenen and Wieland (2000), and a
ten-year real rate in Fuhrer and Moore (1995). Estimation of output equations with either a quarterly real funds rate, a 1-year real
bond rate, or a ten-year real bond rate is examined in Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004).






where α is the CRRA curvature parameter, α > 0, the ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption, Ct, and bond
holdings, Bt, are, respectively,
0 = C−α
t − Λt,
0 = −Λt + Et{βRe,t+1Λt+1}, (23)
where Λ is the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint.
Substituting the ﬁrst equation into the second equation of (23), imposing the market clearing condition,
Ct = Yt, and taking log deviations from equilibria gives the standard NK output equation, such as developed
in Woodford (2003),




The NK output equation appears to indicate that the relevant interest rate for current consumption
decisions is the one-period real interest rate, ρt. However, successively eliminating the forward consumption
term indicates that the current level of consumption is a function of the future path of expected equilibrium
deviations in one-period real rates or, approximately, the equilibrium deviation in the expected real
yield-to-maturity on an n-period bond, ˜ ρn,t.











In both equations (24) and (25), adjustments of current output to perceived equilibrium deviations of
interest rates are instantaneous because there are no frictions or impediments to dynamic adjustments of
real expenditures. In this sense, standard NK output equations are analogous to the present value price of
installed capital, shown earlier in (18). In other words, in the absence of frictions, just as the neoclassical
q theory provides a theory of capital demand but not a theory of investment, the standard NK output
equation reﬂects a theory of consumption demand but not a well-deﬁned theory of dynamic adjustment
in real expenditures.
10To abbreviate notation, the remaining arguments of the separable utility function are not shown.
11As an alternative to introducing explicit costs of adjusting the ﬂow of consumption, we consider the
policy transmission role of interest rates in output equations when multiplicative ‘habits” or reference paths
for consumption, Γt, are introduced into household utility,
U(Ct,.) =
(Ct+iΓ−ν
t )1−α − 1
1 − α
. (26)
In the case of multiplicative exogenous habit, such as “keeping up with the Jones, ” vid. Abel (1990), the
reference level for each household is a function of aggregate consumption. Alternatively, the habit reference
path may be endogenous and refer to the past consumption level of the household, vid. Fuhrer (2000).
Log habit is expressed as a distributed lag of past log consumption,
lnΓt = ν(L)lnCt−1, (27)
where ν(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator, L. The output equation associated with second-order
endogenous habit, ν(L) = ν1 + ν2L, is derived in the appendix. Here, we focus on a one-lag exogenous
habit speciﬁcation.




t−1 − Λt, (28)
replacing the ﬁrst equation in (23). Combining (28) with the second equation in (23) and log-linearizing
about equilibria gives the output equation under exogenous habit
˜ yt = (1 − λ)Et˜ yt+1 + λ˜ yt−1 −
1





By inspection, the two eigenvalues of the characteristic equation are (1, λ
1−λ). There are two solution
formats: If λ > .5, the non-unit root is largest, λ
1−λ > 1, and the solution is
˜ yt = ˜ yt−1 −
1








By contrast, if λ ≤ .5, the unit root is largest, λ

















12where the last line in (31) provides a transparent example of the policy transmission role of the n-period
bond rate under habit.
As noted earlier, speciﬁcations of interest rates in the output equations of empirical macro models vary
widely, with some models using one-period rates and others using long-term rates. Models with explicit
one-period rates do not necessarily imply that bond rates are unimportant in policy transmission. Linear
Euler equations can always be reformulated as functions of the one-period interest rate, although the implied
dynamic restrictions may not be as straight-forward as those in output equations with explicit bond rates.11
The drawback of formulating output equations as functions of the one-period rate is the usual problem of
asymmetric information. Given that theory indicates forecasts of long-horizon returns in bond markets are
important determinants of private sector expenditures, the information set of bond traders is more pertinent,
if not larger, than that of a macro modeller. Unless the modeller ensures that the averages of forward rates
generated by the model are equivalent to observed bond rates, the model description of policy transmission
will reﬂect the modeller’s priors regarding long-horizon forecasts, which may differ markedly from the
long-horizon forecasts contained in bond market observations.12
Interestingly, there is almost no empirical literature exploring competing speciﬁcations of short-term
and long-term interest rates in output equations. If frictions in adjusting real expenditures are important,
the theoretical examples in this section suggest that long-term ex ante real interest rates should dominate
competing short-term real rate regressors in reduced-form regressions. A sequence of bivariate tests is
reported in Kozicki and Tinsley (2002), where U.S. manufacturing utilization, a proxy for the output gap,
is regressed on competing short-term and long-term ex ante real interest rates over a 1967m1 - 1997m7
sample. The tests conﬁrm that spreads between the long-term and short-term interest rates are statistically
insigniﬁcant when regressions are conditioned on the long-term rates and, conversely, long-short spreads
are signiﬁcant when regressions are conditioned on the short-term interest rates.13
11For example, compare equation (73) to equation (74) in the appendix.
12The sensitivity of long-horizon forecasts toalternative modelling assumptions regarding time-variationin conditional equilibria
is illustrated in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2001b) and in section 5 below.
13The explanatory role of credit risk premiums in private borrowing rates is also empirically supported in Kozicki and Tinsley
(2002) but ignored in the current paper.
133.3 The responsiveness of historical bond rates to macro variables
If perceptions of bond traders are an essential link in the transmission of monetary policy then section 2
indicates that the determinacy of policy rests on the sensitivity of nominal bond rates to inﬂation.
The long-run responses of nominal bond rates to inﬂation, the level of unemployment, and the difference
of unemployment are reported in Table 1. Inﬂation is measured by the annualized ﬁrst-difference of the log
deﬂator for personal consumption expenditures (pce), and unemployment by the civilian unemployment
rate. The bond rates are the nominal rates on 1-year, 3-year, 5-year and 10-year zero-coupon bonds from
McCulloch and Kwon (1993). Regressions are reported for two monthly samples.
Regressions reported in the bottom panel of Table 1 span the period after the abandonment of
nonborrowed reserves targeting to the end of the FOMC chairmanship of Paul Volcker, 1982m1 - 1987m7.
The results are consistent with bond trader forecasts of aggressive policy responses to inﬂation. Long-run
mean responses by bond rates to inﬂation are well above unity for all maturities. Signiﬁcant long-run mean
responses are also indicated for the change in unemployment by 1-year and 3-year bond rates. No mean
responses to the level of unemployment are signiﬁcant.
The top panel in Table 1 reports on regressions for a 1966-79 sample, ending just prior to the
announcement of the well-known shift in operational policy in October 1979.14 The second column in
the top panel indicates that the mean long-run response to inﬂation is above unity for bond rates of all
maturities. Perhaps consistent with bond trader perceptions of the emphasis of 1970s central bank policy
on money growth targeting, the mean long-run response to the change of the unemployment rate is also
signiﬁcant for all maturities.
As the results of Table 1 are consistent with elastic bond rate responses to inﬂation in both samples, it
appears that the lower bound condition for determinacy of monetary policy derived in section 2 is satisﬁed in
the 1960s and 1970s, as well as in the 1980s. However, bond trader perceptions that, on average, monetary
policy was consistent with stable policy responses to inﬂation appears to contradict the evidence of passive
policy rate responses in the 1960s and 1970s in such studies as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik
and Schorfeide (2004). Possible resolutions of this puzzle are explored in the remaining sections of this
paper.
14The federal funds market was not well-developed prior to 1966, vid. Tinsley et al. (1982) and Fuhrer (1996).
144 No-arbitrage bond pricing under horizon-dependent perceptions
Thelowerbound for determinacy ofmonetary policy derived insection 2requires that equilibrium deviations
in nominal bond rates should be elastic with respect to equilibrium deviations in expected inﬂation over the
maturities of the bonds or, equivalently, that equilibrium deviations in ex ante real interest rates should
respond positively to deviations in expected inﬂation.
Examples in preceding sections have implicitly assumed that term premiums of bond rates are constant
over time and drop out of equilibrium deviations. An alternative is to allow for term premiums that may
vary systematically with macro variables.


















Etrt,i + Ψn,t. (32)
The ﬁrst line of (32) indicates that the nominal bond rate is the average of forward rates, ft,i, over the
lifetime of the bond. The second line shows that the forward rate in the ith period of the n-period forecast
horizon is equal to the expected policy rate in the ith period, Etrt,i, plus a possibly time-varying forward
rate term premium, ψt,i. The last line shows that the term premium of the n-period bond rate, Ψt,n, is equal
to the average of the forward rate term premiums.15
As bond rates consist not only of expected policy rate averages but averages of possibly time-varying
forward rate term premiums, one potential explanation of elastic responses of nominal bond rates to inﬂation
inthe 1960s and 1970s isthat time-varying term premiums mayoperate asautomatic stabilizers, reducing the
effective lower bound required for determinate policy rate responses. This explanation rests on systematic
positive responses of forward rate term premiums to expected inﬂation.
The next two subsections sketch a class of no-arbitrage models of bond rate pricing, developed by Duffee
(2002), that provides a tractable formulation of term premium responses to macro determinants of policy
rates, such as inﬂation.16This model is extended in the remaining subsections to allow for horizon-dependent
15In the terminology of Shiller (1990), Ψn,t is the rollover term premium.
16Recent examples of empirical estimates of the term structure exploring macro variable determinants of term premiums include
Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Rudebusch and Wu (2004a, 2004b), Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2005), Duffee (forthcoming), and
Dewachter and Lyrio (forthcoming(a) and forthcoming(b)).
15expectations.
4.1 Macro variable dynamics
Explicit macro variables are introduced to characterize bond trader perceptions of expected policy rate
responses. Bond traders may also price unobserved variables. Latent factors associated with additional
determinants of bond prices are assumed to be orthogonal to the observed macro factors and irrelevant for
the current analysis.
The dynamics of macro variables are described by a ﬁrst-order companion form system
Xt = φ + ΦXt−1 + εt, (33)
where the stochastic driving vector, εt, is denoted by
εt ≡ Σǫt, ǫt ∼ N(0,I).
The X vector contains observations on observable macro determinants of the policy rate, such as
unemployment, u, and inﬂation, π.17 Each macro variable is partitioned into its perceived equilibrium
attractor or “natural rate,” such as (¯ πt, ¯ ut), and deviations from these natural rates.18
πt ≡ ¯ πt + ˜ πt,
ut ≡ ¯ ut + ˜ ut, (34)
Variation over time in the natural rate perceptions of bond traders is captured by constant-gain learning
equations,
¯ πt = γ¯ ππt−1 + (1 − γ¯ π)¯ πt−1 + ε¯ π,t,
¯ ut = γ¯ uut−1 + (1 − γ¯ u)¯ ut−1 + ε¯ u,t. (35)
Time-variation in the natural rate deviations of inﬂation and unemployment is captured by a pth-order,
bivariate vector autoregression,
˜ πt = a11,1˜ πt−1 +
p−1 X
i=1
a11,i+1∆˜ πt−i + a12,1˜ ut−1 +
p−1 X
i=1
a12,i+1∆˜ ut−i + ε˜ π,t,
˜ ut = a21,1˜ πt−1 +
p−1 X
i=1
a21,i+1∆˜ πt−i + a22,1˜ ut−1 +
p−1 X
i=1
a22,i+1∆˜ ut−i + ε˜ u,t., (36)
17Additional macro determinants might include observable indicators of disturbances in credit markets.
18In a slight abuse of conventional terminology, it is convenient to refer to the central bank target for inﬂation perceived by bond
traders, ¯ πt, as the “natural rate” for inﬂation.
16If the macro system is stable, each macro variable reverts to its natural rate in the long run.
4.2 No-arbitrage bond pricing under invariant policy responses
As noted earlier, elastic responses of U.S. Treasury bond rates to inﬂation in the 1960s and 1970s seem
difﬁcult to square with evidence from studies indicating the passivity of US monetary policy in those
decades. One possible explanation is that bond term premiums may be sufﬁciently responsive to inﬂation to
overcome a modest inelasticity in policy rate responses.
The policy rate in period t + h, anticipated by bond traders in period t, Etrt,h, is assumed to be a linear
function of macro variables anticipated for t + h,
Etrt,h = δ0 + δ′
1EtXt+h. (37)
The vector of response parameters, δ1, is ﬁxed, both over time and over forecast horizons.
In the absence of arbitrage, the price of a multiperiod asset that does not pay dividends is determined
by the expected product of stochastic discount factors, Mt+i, over the lifetime of the asset. In the case of a
zero-coupon, n-period nominal bond paying $1 at maturity, the current price is
Pn,t = Et{Mt+1Mt+2 ...Mt+n},
= Et{Mt+1Pn−1,t+1}, (38)
where the last line in (38) follows by the law of iterated expectations.
If investors are risk neutral, the one-period stochastic discount factor reduces to
Mt+1 = exp(−rt), (39)
where rt is the policy rate, known in t. However, if investors are risk sensitive, the stochastic discount factor
is
Mt+1 = exp(−rt)ξt+1, (40)
where ξt+1 is the Radon-Nikodym derivative that translates the distribution of the discounted asset price to
a martingale by removing predictable drift due to bond risk premiums.19







19Change of drift under the Girsanov theorem is discussed in Dufﬁe (1996).
17where λ denotes the vector of market prices of uncertainty associated with the stochastic determinants of
the asset price.20 The vector of market prices is assumed to be the essentially afﬁne formulation suggested
by Duffee (2002),
λt+i = λ0 + λ′
1Xt+i. (42)
Given nontrivial risk pricing, the bond traders’ risk-adjusted view of the dynamics of the macro economy
is denoted by
Xt = ˘ φ + ˘ ΦXt−1 + Σ˘ ǫt, (43)
which differs from the empirical (aka physical) dynamics in(33). The difference isdemonstrated by deriving
the bond price valuation under the risk-neutral probability measure, using the risk-adjusted macro model in
(43).
As in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), discrete-time bond prices in this Gaussian afﬁne model of
the term structure can be represented by
Pn,t = exp(−An − B′
nXt). (44)




where the expectation in the ﬁrst line of (45) is under the physical probability measure, and the expectation
in the second line is under the risk-neutral probability measure.
Substitute from (44) and (43) into the second line of (45) and take expectations under the risk-neutral
probability measure to give,
exp(−An − B′
nXt) = exp(−rt − An−1 − B′





Finally, substitute for the policy rate from the perceived policy response equation, (37), and take logs to give
An + B′
nXt = An−1 + B′




n−1ΣΣ′Bn−1 + δ0 + δ′
1Xt. (46)
20If theprobability density of the macro shocks, f(ǫt+1), isGaussian, the translateddensity is alsoGaussian, ξt+1(λt)f(ǫt+1) =
f(ǫt+1 + λt), where the means are shifted by λt.
18Equating constant terms and slope coefﬁcients on both sides of the equal sign in (46) provides recursions
for the bond pricing coefﬁcients under risk-neutral dynamics








n−1˘ Φ + δ′
1. (47)
The initial conditions are A1 = δ0 and B′
1 = δ′
1.
Alternatively, bond pricing recursions using the physical dynamics in (33) can be recovered by adjusting
the stochastic disturbances, ǫ. Recall that the effect of the Radon-Nikodym differential in (45) is to shift the
mean of the disturbances, ǫt, by the relevant pricing vector, λt−1. The risk-neutral disturbances from this
density translation are
˘ ǫt = ǫt + λt−1. (48)
Substituting (48) into the empirical macro system (33) and using the essentially afﬁne deﬁnition of the
pricing vector, λ, in (42) illustrates the risk-adjusted macro perceptions of the bond traders
Xt = φ + ΦXt−1 + Σǫt,
= φ + ΦXt−1 + Σ(˘ ǫt − λt−1),
= (φ − Σλ0) + (Φ − Σλ′
1)Xt−1 + Σ˘ ǫt,
= ˘ φ + ˘ ΦXt−1 + Σ˘ ǫt. (49)
Thus, the bond price recursions in (47) can be restated using the explicit risk-adjusted parameters of the
empirical macro model, where ˘ φ = φ − Σλ0 and ˘ Φ = Φ − Σλ′
1.
The notation convention is that negative entries of λ1 contribute towards positive risk premiums.
Consequently, as can be seen in the third line of (49), negative elements in λ1 will increase the sensitivity of
bond rates to variations in the macro variables, Xt.21
21In the absence of an explicit speciﬁcation of investor utility functions, no theoretical restrictions are imposed on the λ
′
1 matrix.
As the dimensions of the pricing matrix can be large, empirical investigations of essentially afﬁne formulations of asset pricing
often impose zero restrictions on elements of the λ
′
1 matrix, such as Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2005), and
Dewachter and Lyrio (forthcoming(a) and forthcoming(b)). Kim and Orphanides (2005) suggest fewer zero restrictions are required
if measurements include both bond rate data and surveys of interest rate forecasts over short and long horizons. Depending on the
structure of the λ1 matrix, term premium variation linked to a variable may not reﬂect uncertainty in that variable. For example,
suppose Σλ
′
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Note that responses of the term premium to movements in x2,t may not be related to the scale of the x2 shock, s22.
19The adjustments to the slope coefﬁcients of Xt will also alter the dynamics of the risk-adjusted macro
model. To see this, denote the risk-adjusted transition matrix as
˘ Φ = Φ − Σλ′
1,
≡ Φ + Φ∗.
If both the Φ and Φ∗ matrices were diagonal, it is easy to see that positive elements of Φ∗ would increase
the eigenvalues of the matrix sum, ˘ Φ. Or if the trace of Φ∗ is positive, the sum of the eigenvalues of ˘ Φ is
increased. Although it is difﬁcult to generalize the dynamic effects of risk pricing for unrestricted matrices,
it can be shown22 that upper bounds for singular values of ˘ Φ are
σi+j−1(˘ Φ) ≤ σi(Φ) + σj(Φ∗), i + j < q + 1, (50)
where q denotes the minimum rank of (Φ, Φ∗), and σk(A) denotes the singular values of the matrix A, in
decreasing order, σ1 > σ2 > ... > σq. For example, when i = j = 1, the sum of the largest singular values
of Φ and Φ∗ is an upper bound for the largest singular value of ˘ Φ.
4.3 Denoting horizon-dependent perceptions
A second potential explanation of elastic bond rate responses to inﬂation is that bond trader perceptions
of anticipated policy responses may vary over forecast horizons. In other words, even if current policy is
perceived to be insufﬁciently responsive to inﬂation, bond traders may assume that future policy will be
more attentive.
The principal difference in speciﬁcation is that the coefﬁcients of the perceived policy response may
vary over the forecast horizon,
Etrt,h = δ0,h + δ′
1,hEtXt+h, (51)
where (51) replaces the policy rate speciﬁcation shown earlier in (37).
Again, the dynamics of macro variables are described by a ﬁrst-order companion form system, but it
will ease notation considerably to include a constant regressor in the X vector,
Xt = ΦXt−1 + Σǫt,
22Horn and Johnson (1991). For a general matrix A, singular values are nonnegative square roots of the nonzero eigenvalues of
A
∗A or AA
∗. Thus, the inequalities in (50) hold for eigenvalues if the relevant matrices are positive semideﬁnite.
20This altered notation allows horizon-dependent responses to be compactly represented as
Etrt,h = δ′
h+1EtXt+h, (52)
where h indexes periods in the forecast horizon, h = 0,...,H.







t+i−1λt+i−1], i = 1,2,..., (53)
and the price of risk is the essentially afﬁne formulation
λt+i = λ0 + λ′
1Xt+i.





= exp(−An − B′
nXt). (54)
Due to the horizon-dependent structure of the policy rate in (52), the no-arbitrage coefﬁcient sequence,
(Ai,Bi, i = 1,...,n), is altered from that shown in (47). The revised structure of bond price coefﬁcients is
illustrated by the following examples.




































































= exp[−A2 − B′
2Xt], (56)
where











Note that the new terms are all functions of the policy responses in the second period of the forecast horizon,
δ2. This pattern persists in future periods.
More general non-recursive expressions for An and Bn in (54) can be derived as follows:
























































































































































































































































4.4 No-arbitrage formulations of forward rates
The formulations in (59) are particularly convenient for analysis of forward rates. The forward rate, fn−1,
is
ft,n−1 = Etrt,n−1 + ψt,n−1,
23= pn−1,t − pn,t
= An − An−1 + (Bn − Bn−1)′Xt
= Cn + δ′
n(Φ − Σλ′
1)n−1Xt, (60)

























Thus, with horizon-dependent perceptions of policy responses, the effective coefﬁcient vector of the Xt






permitting exploration of “Taylor rule” regressions for forward rates with possibly horizon-varying
coefﬁcients, δ′





Thus, forward rate term premiums are deﬁned by




Recalling the discussion of the singular values of the risk-adjusted transition matrix in (50), if the effect of
the risk pricing matrix, λ′
1, is such that (Φ − Σλ′
1)h is slower to decay than Φh, the slope contributions of
forward rate term premiums will increase over the forecast horizon with h.23
5 Empirical responses of forward rates
The possibility of time-varying forward rate term premiums and horizon-dependent expectations of future
policy rate responses suggests that forward rate responses to expectations of future macro variables may
differ from the current-period policy rate responses estimated by Taylor rules.
This section discusses empirical estimates of forward rate regressions for monthly samples before and
after the major shift in US monetary policy in October 1979.





245.1 Forecast model and learning rate assumptions
A direct test of the combined effects of term premium and expected policy rate responses is to
estimate forward rate response equations over different forward horizons. For monthly observations, the
instantaneous forward rates at twelve month intervals in the forecast horizon are represented by
ft,12h = (1 − ρ1)f∗
t,12h + ρ1ft,12(h−1) + ρ2∆(k)ft,12(h−1) + at,12h, (62)
where the forward rate associated with the bond trader expectation of the policy rate in the absence of policy
lag adjustments is
f∗
t,12h = Et{c0 + c1¯ πt + c2˜ π
(¯ k)
t,12h + c3˜ ut,12h + c4∆(k)ut,12h}.
As before, ¯ πt denotes the bond trader perception in period t of the central bank target for inﬂation; ˜ πt,12h
is the projected deviation of inﬂation in the 12hth month of the forecast horizon; ˜ ut,12h is the projected
deviation of unemployment from bond trader perceptions of the unemployment natural rate, ¯ ut; and the
superscripts, (¯ k) and (k), denote k-period averages and k-period summations, respectively.24 For monthly
data, k = 12.
As the speciﬁcation in (62) is amenable to direct regression, it is straight-forward to check if estimates
of combined responses, such as c2, are consistent with stable bond rate responses, and if responses vary over
different partitions of the forecast horizon. The regressions reported here do not impose the cross-equation
restrictions implied by no-arbitrage, as derived in section 4, on the forward rate regressions of different
horizons. Consequently, it is not possible to determine what proportions of combined responses are due to
forward rate term premium responses, Σλ′
1, or to expected policy rate responses, δh. There is one exception:
under the physical probability measure, the expected response to the perceived inﬂation target is unity,
c1 = 1. Thus, signiﬁcant deviations from c1 = 1 indicate time-variation in forward rate term premiums due
to a time-varying inﬂation target, ¯ πt.
Monthly predictions of expected inﬂation, Etπt,12h, and unemployment, Etut,12h, are generated by a
12th-order VAR in inﬂation and unemployment, whose format was shown in (36).
Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2001b) demonstrate that long-horizon predictions from VAR models are
sensitive to speciﬁcations regarding the conditional equilibria of state variables. To illustrate differences in
long-horizon forecasts, alternative estimates of ex ante real bond rates for 1-year, 5-year, and 10-year zero




25coupon bonds are shown in the three panels of Figure 2, along with the real federal funds rate, ρt. The
multiperiod predictions of inﬂation used to adjust the nominal bond rates are generated by the alternative
monthly VARs discussed in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a).
The perceived equilibrium or central bank target for inﬂation is ﬁxed at the sample mean in the top panel
of Figure 2, ¯ π. Under this speciﬁcation, the 5-year and 10-year real bond rates appear to be trending up in
the 1970s. In the middle panel of Figure 2, the perceived conditional equilibrium for inﬂation, ¯ πt, is similar
to a Beveridge-Nelson unit root trend and closely tracks recent inﬂation. Consequently, ex ante real bond
rates in the middle panel are much more volatile than those in the other two panels and fall sharply below
zero in the ﬁrst half of the 1970s. Inﬂation forecasts incorporated in the real rates shown in the bottom panel
of Figure 2 reﬂect a change-point learning model of shifts in the conditional equilibrium, ¯ πt. Here, the ex
ante real rates on 5-year and 10-year bonds appear to be without much of a discernible trend in the 1970s.
For the forward rate regressions reported below, the time-varying perceptions of bond traders for the
central bank target for inﬂation, ¯ πt, and the natural rate for unemployment, ¯ ut, are represented by the
constant-gain learning equations shown earlier in (35). Kozicki and Tinsley (2001b) indicate that a monthly
gain of γ¯ π = .015 provides an average approximation of private sector long-horizon forecasts of inﬂation
in the 1980s. This benchmark constant-gain proxy for bond trader perceptions of the central bank target for
inﬂation, ¯ πt, is shown in Figure 3, along with the 12-month moving average of pce inﬂation and the Hoey
real-time survey of 5-10 year predictions of CPIinﬂation. As pce inﬂation tends to be somewhat less volatile
than CPI inﬂation, the proxy is about one percentage point lower in early 1980 but then tracks the survey
closely in the remainder of the 1980s. Reductions in survey predictions of long-horizon inﬂation and in the
perceived inﬂation target lag considerably the fall of inﬂation in the early 1980s.
The same benchmark learning rate is assumed for bond trader perceptions of the natural rate of
unemployment, γ¯ u = .015. The associated constant-gain proxy for the natural rate of unemployment
is shown in Figure 4, along with the historical unemployment rate and the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce
(2004) retrospective estimate of the natural rate. As with many real-time estimates of the natural rate of
unemployment, the constant-gain proxy tracks below the retrospective CBO estimate in the 1970s, with an
average underestimation error of about 1.25 percentage points in the ﬁrst half of the 1970s before the error
sharply diminishes in the remainder of the 1970s.
However, results in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2005b) indicate that learning rates need not be constant
over time. Faster learning rates are more likely if agents perceive larger forecast errors for observable
26variables and can reduce the real consequences of perception errors in episodes with a time-varying inﬂation
target. But, faster constant-gain learning rates are inefﬁcient in more tranquil periods, as larger responses to
transient disturbances increase the dispersion of the ergodic distribution of perceived inﬂation targets about a
ﬁxed central bank target. Given the sensitivity of long-horizon forecasts to the speciﬁcation of the perceived
central bank target for inﬂation, as illustrated in Figure 2, we examine the effects of three constant-gain
learning rates. In the case of a ﬁxed inﬂation target, the learning rate is set to zero, γ¯ π = 0.0, and the
perceived inﬂation target is set to the sample mean. The benchmark perception of the central bank inﬂation
target, shown in Figure 3, uses the constant-gain learning rate, γ¯ π = .015, which implies a mean learning
lag of about 5.5 years. Finally, a faster learning rate is also examined for perceptions of the central bank
target for inﬂation, γ¯ π = .03, with a mean learning lag of about 2.8 years.
5.2 Forward rate regressions
Forward rates at 1-year, 3-year, 5-year and 10-year horizons are shown in Figure 5. Although the forward
rates generally move together, large differences can emerge, such as the spread of about 2.3 percentage
points between the 10-year forward rate and the 1-year forward rate in December 1976. As forward rates
at neighboring horizons tend to move closely, the forward rate regressions are grouped into three horizon
partitions: 1-3 years, 4-6 years, and 7-10 years. This grouping assumes that perceived policy rate responses
do not vary signiﬁcantly within a partition. Because the term premium responses within a partition are
not likely to be identical, unless they are zero, the regression residuals will be heteroskedastic reﬂecting
deviations from estimated average responses.
Forward rate regressions for the three partitions are presented in Tables 2a and 2b for a pre-Volcker
sample, 1966 m1 - 1979 m7.25 Emphasis shadings of rows in the tables are judgemental, based in part on
assumptions regarding the reasonableness of the estimated signs. In addition to requiring asymptotic t-ratios
of 1.7 or higher, roughly corresponding to p-values less than .10, estimates of positive mean responses to
unemployment or negative mean responses to inﬂation are not shaded. Although the signs of term premium
responses maybeopposite tothe signs ofexpected policy rate responses, itisunlikely thecombined response
would overturn the direction of the expected policy rate response.26
25During this interval, the FOMC was chaired by William McChesney Martin, Jr, Arthur Burns, and G. William Miller.
26Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) report positive term premiums for inﬂation, with larger premiums for longer maturities. Dewachter
and Lyrio (forthcoming(b)) estimate positive term premiums for inﬂation that rise with maturity and negligible term premiums for
GDPgaps. Positivetermpremiumsarealsoestimatedfor atime-varying centraltendency for inﬂation, similarto ¯ πt; thesepremiums
also rise with maturity and are nearly triple the size of the term premiums for inﬂation. By contrast, Duffee (forthcoming) presents
27Forecasts of inﬂation and unemployment regressors for results in Table 2a are generated by a VAR ﬁt
to the 1960-79 sample under the assumption of the benchmark learning rates, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = .015. The mean
long-run response to the equilibrium deviation in inﬂation, ˜ πt, is statistically insigniﬁcant for forward rates
in the 1-3 year partition; is not statistically different from unity for forward rates in the 4-6 year partition;
and is greater than unity for forward rates in the 7-10 year partition. Thus, the pattern of increasing responses
over the forecast horizon is consistent with elastic responses to expected inﬂation by intermediate-maturity
bond rates in the 1960s and 1970s.
The estimated forward rate responses to the perceived inﬂation target, ¯ π, in Table 2a are around one in
the 4-6 year partition but signiﬁcantly less than unity in the 1-3 year and 7-10 year partitions. Under the
physical probability measure, the expected coefﬁcient of the inﬂation target is one, so this suggests forward
rate term premiums either did not respond, or moved inversely, to the perceived inﬂation target during the
1960s and 1970s. Although mean responses to the forecast level or difference of the unemployment rate are
negative, mean responses are not signiﬁcant in the 1-3 and 4-6 year partitions.
Forward rate responses to expected inﬂation under alternative learning rates are examined in Table 2b for
the pre-Volcker sample. The pattern of increasing inﬂation responses over the forecast horizon is relatively
insensitive to variation in the assumed learning rate. However, determinacy of bond rate responses to
expected inﬂation is better supported for perceptions of a ﬁxed inﬂation target, γ¯ π = 0.0, or the time-varying
inﬂation target generated by the benchmark learning rate, γ¯ π = .015.
Tables 3a and 3b present forward rate regressions for the sample, 1982 m1 - 1987 m7, a period that
encompasses the last six and one-half years of the FOMC chairmanship of Paul Volcker but excludes the
unusual interest rate volatility in 1979-81, during the experiment with nonborrowed reserves as the operating
policy instrument. In Table 3a, the forward rate response to expected inﬂation, c2 is not statistically different
from unity in the 1-3 year partition, and greater than unity in the 4-6 year partition, although not signiﬁcantly
so. The mean inﬂation response in the 7-10 year partition is greater than unity but the associated p-value is
marginally larger than .10.
As with the earlier sample, forward rates do not appear to consistently respond to forecasts of
unemployment. However, in contrast to results in the pre-Volcker sample, the mean responses to the
evidence of negative term premium responses to inﬂation in a pre-Volcker sample. Note that negative term premium responses to
inﬂation could conceivably reverse the historical roles of the inﬂation responses by the central bank and bond traders suggested in
section 2. That is, system indeterminacy could occur if an elastic policy rate response to inﬂation is accompanied by inelastic bond
rate responses to expected inﬂation.
28perceived inﬂation target, c1, in Table 3a are signiﬁcantly greater than unity in the 1-3 year and 4-6 year
partitions. This suggests forward rate term premiums responded positively to the perceived inﬂation target
in the 1980s.
Forward rate responses to expected inﬂation in the 1980s under alternative learning rates are examined
in Table 3b. Here, the pattern of increasing responses to expected inﬂation over the forecast horizon is
statistically supported when the inﬂation target learning rate is equal to or exceeds the benchmark learning
rate. Positive responses of forward rate term premiums to the perceived inﬂation target, c1 > 1, are also
indicated for the benchmark learning rate, γ¯ π = .015, and the faster learning rate, γ¯ π = .03.
Although the forward rate regressions provide only rough approximations of combined forward rate
responses to macro variables, two results appear to be common to the pre-Volcker sample and the 1980s
sample. First, forward rate responses to equilibrium deviations in inﬂation are generally larger at more
distant horizons and often greater than one, consistent with elastic bond rate responses to inﬂation. Second,
there is little evidence of systematic responses by forward rates to the level or difference of unemployment.
A notable difference in sample results is that positive responses by forward rate term premiums to a
time-varying inﬂation target are supported in the 1980s sample but not in the pre-Volcker sample.
6 Concluding remarks
Central bankers propose monetary policies but bond traders dispose, through expectations of future policy
rates and term premiums that price uncertain outcomes. This paper examines several implications of bond
rate transmission of monetary policy.
As discussed in section 2, some interpretations of the Great Inﬂation have focused on the stability of a
Taylor rule description of the policy rate or on central bank assumptions regarding natural rates. If the bond
rate is the transmission channel for monetary policy, these possible shortcomings in policy are not sufﬁcient
to assess the stability of the economy. The section shows that conditions for determinate equilibrium require
a lower bound on bond rate responses to expected inﬂation.
The bond rate plays no essential dynamic role in models that exclude frictions on dynamic adjustment
of real variables, such as the standard New Keynesian model. Section 3 illustrates the role of bond rates
in dynamic output equations when endogenous or exogenous habits are introduced into household utility
functions. Although dynamic expenditure equations are often formulated as functions only of the one-period
29interest rate, the elimination of market bond rate observations substitutes the information set of the modeller
for the more relevant information set of bond traders in long-horizon forecasts.
It is also noted that nominal bond rate responses to inﬂation are generally elastic with respect to inﬂation,
even in the 1960s and 1970s when studies have demonstrated that the policy rate did not keep pace with
inﬂation. This is puzzling as the forward rates of bond rates contain bond trader expectations of future
policy rates. One possible explanation is that forward rate term premiums that price the uncertainty of
expected inﬂation may operate as automatic stabilizers, reducing the lower bound requirement for expected
policy rate responses. Another possibility is that bond trader expectations are horizon-dependent, so that
longer-run expectations of policy are not cloned replications of current-period policy responses.
Toaccommodate these possibilities, the essentially afﬁne model of no-arbitrage bond pricing is extended
in section 4 to allow for horizon-dependent expectations of policy rate responses.
Forward rate regressions, presented in section 5, provide empirical support for the conjecture that
forward rate responses at more distant horizons display larger long-run responses to equilibrium deviations
in expected inﬂation. The regressions also suggest forward rate term premiums responded positively to
perceptions of a time-varying inﬂation target in the 1980s but not in the 1960s and 1970s. Isolating the
separate contributions of time-varying term premiums and horizon-dependent expectations of future policy
rates will require imposing no-arbitrage cross-equation restrictions on the forward rate regressions.
If horizon-dependent perceptions are conﬁrmed in future work, it would be useful to explore possible
reasons for horizon dependency in expectations. If long-horizon expectations are merely inertial, that inertia
can partially insulate the economy from poor monetary policies, as may have occurred in the 1960s and
1970s, but may also attenuate responses to new monetary policies.
30Appendix
Determinate and indeterminate solutions for equation (5).
The ﬁrst-order equation
˜ πt =  Et˜ πt+1 + bet,
is cast into a ﬁrst-order companion form
A1yt+1 = A0yt + aeet + aηηt,
where y′

































the reduced form is





















By inspection, the eigenvalues of B0 are (0, 1
















Multiplying equation (63) by P−1 expresses the reduced form as an explicit function of the system
eigenvalues,
























x2,t−1 + g2,t + f2,t. (65)
case 1: | | < 1
In this instance, the second equation in (65) is unstable. The solution of the ﬁrst equation is






1 − γ 
,
which implies Et˜ πt+1 =
bγet
1−γ . Substituting this solution for expected inﬂation into the second equation of
(65) gives
ηt =  Et˜ πt+1 − Et˜ πt + bet,
=
 bγet
1 − γ 
−
bγbet−1








1 − γ 
.
Thus, when the nonzero root, 1
  is unstable, the inﬂation solution is unique and requires that rational forecast
errors, ηt, are determined solely by the structural errors, ǫt.
case 2: | | > 1
Inthis instance, thenonzero root, 1




















et−1 + ηt. (66)
Other than requiring that ηt be a martingale difference, the assumption of rational expectations does not
impose additional restrictions on the forecast errors. In addition to containing an arbitrary exogenous
32(sunspot) shock, st, the forecast error may also be correlated with the structural disturbance,
ηt = mǫt + st.
Thus, the reduced form generates multiple solutions associated with arbitrary sunspots, st. Realizations of
inﬂation will depend on what mechanisms agents use to coordinate on particular sunspot shocks.27
Eigenvalues of the companion form for equation (12).
The second-order inﬂation equation






Et˜ πt+2 + bet,
is restated in the ﬁrst-order companion form
A1yt+1 = A0yt + aeet + aηηt,
where y′



































the reduced form is
















λ1 + λ2 =
2 − ab(c1 − 1)
ab(c2 − 1)
.
27Equation (5) is a scalar example of the NK class of forward-looking rational expectation models. In contrast to Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2000), who suggest that the 1970s inﬂation may be explained by sunspot equilibria under passive monetary policy,
Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) indicate that sunspot equilibria generated by NK models with an unstable Taylor rule cannot be
learned by adaptive regressions.
33Bond rate transmission under second-order endogenous habit (vid. equation (27)).
To illustrate the dynamic adjustments associated with more complex speciﬁcations of endogenous habit,
consider the case where log habit is a distributed lag of past log consumption,
lnΓt = ν(L)lnCt−1, (67)
and ν(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator, L.28 For 2nd-order habit, ν(L) = ν1+ν2L, the utility function











which illustrates that the effect of higher-order endogenous habit in concave utility functions is to smooth
higher-order differences in consumption.29












t − Λt. (69)
Substituting in the deﬁnition of endogenous habit and log-linearizing about equilibria gives the linear
Euler equation for output under endogenous habit
˜ yt = Et{[a1(L + βF) + a2(L2 + β2F2)]˜ yt − a3˜ λt}, (70)
where L and F are the lag and lead time series operators, respectively. The coefﬁcients of (70) are identiﬁed
by
a1 = d−1v1(α − 1)(1 − v2β); a2 = d−1v2(α − 1); a3 = d−1(1 − v1β − v2β2), (71)
where d ≡ α + βv1(v1(α − 1) − 1) + β2v2(v2(α − 1) − 1).
The regressor, ˜ λt, in the last term of the linearized Euler equation, (70), is the equilibrium deviation of
the log of the Lagrangian multiplier, Λt. Log equilibrium deviations of the second equation in (23) indicate
that





≃ nEt˜ ρn,t (72)
28To simplify notation, we assume the sum of the polynomial weights in (67) is equal to the exponent of inverse habit in the (26)
description of utility, ν(1) ≡ ν. In contrast to the logarithmic weighted average in (67), originally proposed in Kozicki and Tinsley
(2002), a linear weighted average is suggested in Fuhrer (2000). Corrado and Holly (2004) demonstrate that the linear weighted
average speciﬁcation can violate desirable properties of utility functions.
29See discussion and earlier references to polynomial characterizations of frictions in Kozicki and Tinsley (2002).
34where ˜ λt is the equilibrium deviation of the log of the Langrange multiplier and ˜ ρt is the real one-period
interest rate deviation. For large n, the last line indicates that the inﬁnite forward sum is approximated by
the equilibrium deviation of the expected yield-to-maturity on an n-period bond, ˜ ρn,t.
Substituting from (72) into the output equation (70), gives




≃ Et{[a1(L + βF) + a2(L2 + β2F2)]˜ yt − na3˜ ρn,t}, (73)
where the second line in (73) is a transparent illustration of the policy transmission role of real rates on
long-maturity bonds in dynamic adjustments of output demand under endogenous habit.
In the absence of habit, ν1 = ν2 = 0. Using the deﬁnitions in (71), it is easy to verify that without habit,
the Euler equation coefﬁcients are a1 = a2 = 0;a3 = 1
α, and the last line in (73) reverts to the last line in
(25).
As noted earlier, linear Euler equations can always be reformulated as functions of the one-period
interest rate, although the implied dynamic restrictions may not be as straight-forward as those in output
equations involving bond rates, such as (31) and (73).
To illustrate, substitute the log-linearized equation under endogenous habit (70) into the ﬁrst line of (72).
The result can be rearranged as
∆˜ yt = Et{˜ yt+1 − ˜ yt−1 + a′
1(β∆˜ yt+2 + ˜ yt+1 − ˜ yt−1) + a′
2(β2∆˜ yt+3 + ∆˜ yt−1) − a′
3˜ ρt}, (74)














Again, it is straight-forward to verify that the absence of endogenous habit, ν1 = ν2 = 0, implies that the
equation displaying the one-period interest rate, (74), collapses to the standard NK output equation, shown
in (24).
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37Table 1: Bond Rate Responsiveness to Macro Variables 1.
r∗
t,12h = b0 + b1πt−1 + b11(L)∆πt−1 + b2ut−1 + b22(L)∆ut−1.
rt,12h = b3rt−1,12h + b33(L)∆rt−1,12 + (1 − b3)r∗
t,12h + at,12h.
bond π u ∆u test
rate b1 b2 b22(1) b3 b1 > 1 2
sample: 1966 m1 - 1979 m9
h = 1 1.37 -1.28 -1.94 .880 .77
(2.8) (-2.0) (-3.1) (12)
h = 3 1.06 -.889 -1.44 .864 .58
(3.8) (-2.3) (-3.2) (13)
h = 5 1.05 -.853 -1.15 .864 .58
(3.6) (-2.1) (-3.2) (15)
h = 10 1.12 -.904 -.812 .898 .64
(3.4) (-1.8) (-3.0) (20)
sample: 1982 m1 - 1987 m7
h = 1 1.96 .068 -3.92 .704 .99
(4.9) (.19) (-2.8) (7.8)
h = 3 1.95 .214 -2.97 .757 .96
(3.7) (.50) (-2.1) (10)
h = 5 1.73 .338 -2.42 .774 .87
(2.7) (.71) (-1.5) (11)
h = 10 1.20 .551 -2.42 .795 .60
(1.6) (1.0) (-1.5) (12)
1. bii(L) are 11th-order polynomials in L. Parentheses contain ratios
of coefﬁcients to asymptotic standard errors.
2. p-values.Table 2a: Forward rate regressions, pre-Volcker 1966 - 1979,




c0 + c1¯ πt + c2˜ π
(¯ k)
t,12h + c3˜ ut,12h + c4∆(k)ut,12h
o
.
ft,12h = ρ1ft,12(h−1) + ρ2∆(k)ft,12(h−1) + (1 − ρ1)f∗
t,12h + at,12h.
forward ¯ π ˜ π(k) ˜ u ∆(k)u
rate c1 c2 c3 c4 ρ1 ρ2
time-varying perceived natural rates, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.015
h = 1-3 .588 -.042 – – .513 -.009
(9.2) (-0.4) (16) (-0.2)
.581 -.042 -.023 – .509 -.005
(9.1) (-0.4) (-0.3) (15) (-0.1)
.581 .056 – -.172 .518 -.017
(9.0) (0.3) (-0.6) (16) (-0.4)
h = 4-6 .904 .661 – – .877 .219
(10) (2.5) (38) (2.5)
.861 .375 -.564 – .873 .211
(8.5) (1.5) (-1.5) (39) (2.4)
.860 2.92 – -2.65 .873 .211
(8.4) (1.8) (-1.5) (39) (2.4)
h = 7-10 .796 2.70 – – .967 .877
(25) (3.9) (178) (20)
.813 1.32 -2.86 – .967 .873
(25) (1.8) (-3.7) (179) (20)
.813 13.8 – -13.1 .967 .873
(25) (4.3) (-3.7) (179) (20)
1. Superscript (¯ k) denotes k-period averages. For monthly data, k = 12.
Parentheses contain ratios of coefﬁcients to HAC standard errors.
VAR forecast model sample: 1960 m1 - 1979 m7.Table 2b: Forward rate regressions, pre-Volcker 1966 - 1979,




c0 + c1¯ πt + c2˜ π
(¯ k)
t,12h + c3˜ ut,12h + c4∆(k)ut,12h
o
.
ft,12h = ρ1ft,12(h−1) + ρ2∆(k)ft,12(h−1) + (1 − ρ1)f∗
t,12h + at,12h.
forward ¯ π ˜ π(k) ˜ u ∆(k)u
rate c1 c2 c3 c4 ρ1 ρ2
ﬁxed perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.0
h = 1-3 1.0 .320 – – .540 -.037
(5.1) (14) (-0.7)
h = 4-6 1.0 .929 – – .970 .312
(1.8) (54) (3.1)
h = 7-10 1.0 1.59 – – .981 .870
(13) (346) (20)
time-varying perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.015
h = 1-3 .588 -.042 – – .513 -.009
(9.2) (-0.4) (16) (-0.2)
h = 4-6 .904 .661 – – .877 .219
(10) (2.5) (38) (2.5)
h = 7-10 .796 2.70 – – .967 .877
(25) (3.9) (178) (20)
time-varying perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = 0.03;γ¯ u = .015
h = 1-3 .499 -.012 – – .503 -.001
(10) (-0.2) (17) (-0.0)
h = 4-6 .670 .422 – – .866 .216
(9.9) (2.1) (36) (2.3)
h = 7-10 .694 1.24 – – .965 .879
(26) (4.0) (164) (20)
1. Superscript (¯ k) denotes k-period averages. For monthly data, k = 12.
Parentheses contain ratios of coefﬁcients to HAC standard errors.
VAR forecast model sample: 1960 m1 - 1979 m7.Table 3a: Forward Rate Regressions, Volcker 1982 - 1987




c0 + c1¯ πt + c2˜ π
(¯ k)
t,12h + c3˜ ut,12h + c4∆(k)ut,12h
o
.
ft,12h = ρ1ft,12(h−1) + ρ2∆(k)ft,12(h−1) + (1 − ρ1)f∗
t,12h + at,12h.
forward ¯ π ˜ π(k) ˜ u ∆(k)u
rate c1 c2 c3 c4 ρ1 ρ2
time-varying perceived natural rates: γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.015
h = 1-3 3.63 .732 – – 0.574 -.155
(8.4) (2.6) (9.9) (-3.1)
3.62 .731 .007 – .574 -.155
(9.5) (2.8) (0.0) (10) (-3.1)
3.85 .429 – .759 .529 -.120
(9.9) (1.3) (1.9) (9.1) (-2.4)
h = 4-6 3.28 1.12 – – .918 -.232
(3.6) (1.8) (24) (-2.3)
.754 9.18 -20.2 – .955 -.265
(0.2) (1.1) (-1.0) (26) (-2.7)
.226 -1.50 – 13.3 .958 -.268
(0.1) (-0.6) (1.0) (27) (-2.8)
h = 7-10 -.686 6.64 – – .957 .450
(-0.4) (1.6) (60) (5.4)
1.62 -76.1 119 – .942 .485
(2.0) (-2.6) (2.7) (65) (6.4)
2.15 -7.67 – -28.6 .934 .467
(2.7) (-1.9) (-3.2) (60) (6.2)
1. Superscript (¯ k) denotes k-period averages. For monthly data, k = 12.
Parentheses contain ratios of coefﬁcients to HAC standard errors.
VAR forecast model sample: 1982 m1 - 1987 m7.Table 3b: Forward rate regressions, Volcker 1982 - 1987,




c0 + c1¯ πt + c2˜ π
(¯ k)
t,12h + c3˜ ut,12h + c4∆(k)ut,12h
o
.
ft,12h = ρ1ft,12(h−1) + ρ2∆(k)ft,12(h−1) + (1 − ρ1)f∗
t,12h + at,12h.
forward ¯ π ˜ π(k) ˜ u ∆(k)u
rate c1 c2 c3 c4 ρ1 ρ2
ﬁxed perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.0
h = 1-3 1.0 4.37 – – .850 -.262
(2.1) (24) (-4.8)
h = 4-6 1.0 75.7 – – .978 -.285
(1.1) (53) (-2.9)
h = 7-10 1.0 36.2 – – .936 .412
(0.9) (80) (4.6)
time-varying perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.015
h = 1-3 3.63 .732 – – .574 -.155
(8.4) (2.6) (9.9) (-3.1)
h = 4-6 3.28 1.12 – – .918 -.232
(3.6) (1.8) (24) (-2.3)
h = 7-10 -.686 6.64 – – .957 .450
(-0.4) (1.6) (60) (5.4)
time-varying perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = 0.03;γ¯ u = .015
h = 1-3 2.22 .774 – – .617 -.171
(5.7) (2.3) (10) (-3.3)
h = 4-6 2.04 1.38 – – .933 -.240
(2.8) (1.7) (26) (-2.3)
h = 7-10 1.40 4.01 – – .934 .441
(3.1) (3.2) (61) (5.6)
1. Superscript (¯ k) denotes k-period averages. For monthly data, k = 12.
Parentheses contain ratios of coefﬁcients to HAC standard errors.












1. Twelve-month moving average of annualized inﬂation in the deﬂator for personal consumption
expenditures (pce), and the negative of deviations in the civilian unemployment rate from


















1966 1971 1976 1981 1986
1. The central bank target for inﬂation perceived by bond traders, ¯ πt, is ﬁxed in the top panel,
difference-stationary in the middle panel, and based on change-point learning in the bottom
panel (see text). Thin dotted line is real federal funds rate; thin solid line is real rate on a 1-year
zero coupon bond (ZCB); thick dotted line is real rate on a 5-year ZCB; and thick solid line is













1. solid line: perceived inﬂation target with learning gain, γ¯ π = .015 (see text).
dashed: Hoey survey of expected 5-10 year inﬂation.
dotted: inﬂation in personal consumption expenditure (pce) deﬂator, 12-month average.












1. solid line: perceived natural rate of unemployment with learning gain γ¯ u = .015 (see text).
dashed: Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2004) estimate of natural rate for unemployment.










1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
10-year
1-year
1. thin solid line: 1-year forward rates; thin dotted line: 3-year forward rates; thick dotted line:
5-year forward rates; thick solid line: 10-year forward rates. Forward interest rates from
McCulloch-Kwon (1993).